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Fiscal policy can change poverty and inequality substantially or little depending on the government’s 
redistributive effort. We develop a diagnostic framework to assess how aligned fiscal policies are 
with supporting a minimum living standard and human capital accumulation, as well as reducing 
inequality. The Commitment to Equity Assessment (CEQ) evaluates efforts based on whether 
governments: i. collect and allocate enough resources to support a minimum living standard for all; 
ii. collect and distribute resources equitably; iii. ensure spending is fiscally sustainable and that 
programs are of good quality and incentive compatible; iv. collect and publish relevant information 
as well as are subject to independent evaluations. The CEQ relies on inequality, poverty and tax and 
benefit incidence analyses. 
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Based  on  the  economics  of  the  welfare  state,  the  Commitment  to  Equity  Assessment  (CEQ)  is  a 
diagnostic framework to measure and evaluate how aligned government expenditures and taxes are 
with  supporting  a  minimum  living  standard  and  reducing  inequality  in  ways  that  are  broadly 
consistent  with  macroeconomic  stability,  microeconomic  efficiency  and  growth. Inspired  by the 
economics of the welfare state,
2 CEQ evaluates government efforts in individual countries in terms 
of  the  following  criteria.  Do  governments  collect  and  allocate  enough  resources  to  support  a 
minimum living standard and human capital accumulation for all? Is the collection and distribution 
of fiscal resources consistent with eradicating the extreme income and human capital poverty gaps? 
Do they collect and distribute resources equitably? Do they ensure spending is fiscally sustainable 
and that programs are incentive compatible? Do they collect and publish relevant information and 
are they subject to independent evaluations? For each criterion there are quantitative and qualitative 
indicators derived from poverty and inequality analysis, tax and benefit incidence analysis as well as 
best  practices  in  macroeconomic  management,  program  and  policy  design  and  evaluation,  and 
accountability indicators.
3 
   
CEQ’s main purpose is to inform governments of how their public finances affect their equity goals, 
recommend practical measures, and enhance accountability and transparency through better data 
collection and evaluation systems.
4  In the case of Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and very 
poor countries more broadly, CEQ contributes to inform donors on the orders of magnitude of 
resource shortfalls to achieve certain goals (for example, reducing poverty by half and universal 
coverage of primary education) as well as on the actual use and ability of foreign aid to help achieve 
these goals. Of course, CEQ can be used for other purposes: for example, participatory budgeting 
processes and non-governmental social observatories. In the future, CEQ will be used to construct a 
Commitment to Equity Index to rank countries and monitor their performance over time.
5  
 
While there has been substantial progress in the methods and approaches to evaluate individual 
policies and programs, there is really no instrument to evaluate social policy as a system. CEQ has 
been created to fill that void.  CEQ is one of the first frameworks to assess social policy –or, rather, 
public  policy  with  social  equity  objectives—comprehensively  and  to  make  the  assessment 
comparable across countries.   
                                                             
2  See, for example, Musgrave (1957) and Barr (2004). 
3 For the limitations of static incidence analysis see, for example, Bergh (2005).  Also, see Adema and Ladaique (2005), Atkinson 
(1983), Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva (2003), Barr (2004), Barros et al. (2009), Birdsall et al. (2008), Breceda et al. (2008), Dilnot et 
al. (1990), Ferreira and Robalino (2010), Fiszbein et al. (2009), Grosh et al. (2008), Goñi et al. (2008), Kakwani (1977), Lambert (2002), 
Lora (2006), Morra et al. (2009), Lustig (2000), O’Donnell et al. (2008), Shah (2003), Suits (1977), van de Walle and Nead (1995), 
World Bank (2000/2001, 2006, 2009b, 2011). 
4 CEQ assesses efforts and not outcomes. CEQ can be viewed as a complement to ongoing initiatives such as the World Bank’s 
biennial  Human  Opportunity  Index  (Barros  et  al.,  2009),  UNDP’s  Human  Development  Index  and  the  UN’s  MDGs  (Millennium 
Development Goals) Monitoring. 
5 Also a joint initiative of the Inter-American Dialogue and Tulane University’s CIPR and Economics Department, the construction 
of such an index is under way. 4 
 
 
This handbook has two main purposes: to present the methodological framework of CEQ and a 
step-by-step guide to applying it in practice, including precise definitions of the variables used in the 
assessment. Section 2 highlights the redistributive effort of the state in Latin America. Section 3 
outlines the characteristics of the CEQ diagnostic framework.  Section 4 presents the diagnostic 
questionnaire. Section  5  discusses  some  of  the  main  concepts  used  in  the  framework  and  data 
requirements. Section 6 includes the technical definitions of variables and indicators to apply CEQ 
in a specific country. 
  
 
2.  Commitment to Equity in Latin America: a Long Way to Go 
 
Latin  America  is  the  most  unequal  region  in  the  world.  With  a  Gini  coefficient
6  of  .53,  Latin 
America is 19 percent more unequal than Sub-Saharan Africa, 37 percent more unequal than East 
Asia, and 65 percent more unequal than developed countries (Figure 1).  Latin America’s poverty 
rate
7 (using the US$2.50 a day international poverty line) is 22.1 percent. In contrast, East Asia’s 
poverty rate (50.7 percent) is nearly double Latin America’s, and poverty rates in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(80.5 percent) and South Asia (84.4 percent) are roughly four times higher (Figure 2). This should 
come as no surprise; Latin America is richer than other regions. Its per capita GDP (adjusted for 
cost of living) is around two times higher than E ast Asia’s and is close to five times that of Sub-
Saharan Africa.
8 A small percentage of the world’s extreme poor live in Latin America; in 2005, the 
share was approximately 4%.
9 In absolute numbers, however, Latin America has around 120 million 
people living below US$2.50, or twice as many as Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
10 The 16 million 
living on less than a US$1.25 a day international poverty line in Brazil and Mexico alone in 2005 was 
about the same as the entire population of sixteen Least Developed Countries.
11 Because of its 
highly unequal distribution of income, Latin America has to grow much faster than other regions to 
achieve the same reductions in poverty.
12  
   
                                                             
6 Named after its proponent, the Gini coefficient is a commonly used indicator to measure inequality. The Gini coefficient is an index 
that can take values between zero and one (or between zero and 100, if in percent). The closer it is to zero (one), the less (more) 
unequal the distribution in question. Available Ginis are usually not above .65 or below .20.   
7 The incidence of poverty is measured with the headcount ratio equal to the number of people living below the poverty line divided 
by the total population. Poverty rates are from Chen and Ravallion (2008 p. 33). Poverty rates are for 2005.  
8 All the comparisons here are made using GDP per capita PPP in constant 2005 international $ from World Bank (2008b).  
9 Author’s comparisons based on Chen and Ravallion (2008 p. 32 Table 6). 
10 Based on Chen and Ravallion (2008 p. 32 Table 6). 
11 Author’s calculations based on 2005 population statistics from World Bank (2008b) and 2005 poverty estimates from World Bank 
(2009a). The Least Developed Countries used for comparison are: Bhutan, Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-
Bissau, Kiribati, Lesotho, Liberia, Maldives, Mauritania, Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Vanuatu. 
Information on Least Developed Countries from United Nations Development Policy and Analysis Division (online). 
12 Perry et al. (2006 p. 4 Table 1.1); De Ferranti et al. (2004 pp. 26-27); World Bank (2005 pp. 84-85). 5 
 
 
Figure 1 - Inequality by Region, 2004 
 
Source: López-Calva and Lustig (2010).   
 
Figure 2 - Poverty by Region, 2005 
 
Source: Chen and Ravallion (2008).  
 
One  fundamental  reason  why  inequality  is  high  in  Latin  America  is  because  governments 
underutilize  their  power  to  reduce  income  inequality  through  fiscal  policy.  Fiscal  policy  can 














































































































services that build human capital, such as education, health and nutrition). On both fronts, Latin 
American governments redistribute relatively little.  
 
Before direct taxes and monetary transfers, Latin America’s income inequality,
13 measured by the 
Gini  coefficient,  is  approximately  13  percent  higher  than  the  average  before  direct  taxes  and 
transfers inequality for advanced European countries. In contrast, Latin America’s income inequality 
after taxes and monetary transfers is approximately 60 percent higher than the advanced European 
countries’ after taxes and transfers average.
14  This is a consequence of two factors.  First, most 
governments in Latin America collect less tax revenues than their European counterparts.
15 Second, 
monetary  transfers  are  a  smaller  share  of  government  spending  in  Latin  America  and  are  not 
necessarily progressive.
16 For instance, targeted cash transfers represent a small share of government 
spending:  for  example,  “while  in  the  United  Kingdom  per  capita  cash  transfers  to  the  poorest 
income quintile amount to 6.9 percent of GDP per capita, the average in our Latin American sample 
equals less than one percent, with the country spending the most – Mexico – transferring only 1.1 
percent to the poor.”
17   
 
Even if one adds in-kind transfers (that is, government spending on education and health that 
people consume in the form of free or quasi-free public services), the redistributive impact is still 
limited.
18  Incidence analysis finds a fairly flat distribution of social spending across income quintiles 
in  Latin  America.
19  In  the  case  of  education,  for  example,  this  low  redistributive  impact  of 
government spending is the consequence of overall education spending that is generally progressive, 
but  highly  regressive  at  the  tertiary  level.
20  In  health,  fairly  progressive  spending  on  the  non-
contributory population is largely offset by contributory systems, where most of the benefits accrue 
to the non-poor.
21    
                                                             
13 Pre-taxes and monetary transfers income inequality is also sometimes called pre-fiscal inequality. 
14 López and Perry (2008 p. 18-19) and Goñi et al. (2008, p. 5 n.14). Author’s calculations based on Goñi et al. (2008 pp. 5-6): The 
market income Gini for the Latin American countries in the sample was .52, and the disposable income Gini was .5; the market 
income Gini for European countries in the sample was .46 and the disposable income Gini was .31. This estimate includes monetary 
transfers and direct taxes only. In-kind transfers and indirect taxes, such as VAT, are not included in the analysis. The comparison 
should be viewed with certain caution since the market income inequality is quite likely endogenous to the existing transfer systems.  
If pensions were not generous enough, for example, households which now portray zero or low market incomes would probably have 
higher levels of market incomes.   
15 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and The Development Centre (2008 p.122). 
16 OECD and The Development Centre (2008 p. 60-61); Goñi et al. (2008 p. 18). 
17 Breceda et al., p. 13. 
18 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2007 p. 105-111); OECD and The Development Centre 
(2008 p. 32-33); López-Calva and Lustig (2010 chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). See Huber et al. (2006 p. 950-951). 
19 See, for example, ECLAC (2007 p. 125), López (2006), Breceda et al. (2008 p. 11). 
20 Since the vast majority of students from poor families never reach the tertiary level, the result is a massive subsidy to the middle and 
upper classes. More than 70 percent of the benefits of public spending on higher education go to the richest 40 percent of the 
population. Breceda et al.(2008 p.12).  
21  Breceda  et  al.  (2008  p.11)  write  that  “…aside  from  Nicaragua  –  public  health  spending  is  quite  pro-rich:  on  average,  the 
government spends on the poorest income quintile 70 percent of what it spends on the richest quintile. In addition, many Latin 
American countries have a two-tier health system (usually linked to people’s work status) which contrasts [with] the universal health 
system  of  the  United  Kingdom.  Accordingly,  in  Latin  America  universal  health  spending  declines  with  people’s  income,  while 
contributory health spending…strongly increases...." 7 
 
 
The good news is that Latin America has made progress in the last decade; in several countries 
monetary transfers and subsidies as well as in-kind transfers have become more progressive (that is, 
less regressive).
22  In Brazil and Mexico, for example, large-scale conditional cash transfers targeted 
to the poor have reduced post-transfer inequality and poverty.
23 These programs have demonstrated 
that redistribution to the poor—even to those in remote areas—is technically feasible. Changes in 
the composition of public spending in education (towards basic education, for instance) and health 
(towards  preventative  care  of  the  uninsured,  for  instance),  have  made  in-kind  transfers  more 
equitable in some countries.
24 There also have been greater efforts in some countries to bring basic 
infrastructure (electricity, water, sanitation and sewerage) to the rural poor.
25  
 
Given these encouraging trends, this is an auspicious time to assess Latin American governments’ 
commitment to foster social equity through fiscal policy.  The CEQ can be used to do just that.  
What follows is a description of this diagnostic tool. 
 
3.  Commitment to Equity Assessment (CEQ): a Methodological Framework 
 
The first main objective of the welfare state is supporting a minimum living standard.
26 Supporting a 
minimum living standard, in turn, entails three goals: i. poverty reduction: that is, ensuring that everyone 
has a minimum level of consumption; ii. insurance: that is, preventing individuals from falling (or 
falling further) below the minimum level of consumption due to adverse shocks, both idiosyncratic 
(unemployment, illness, disability, bad harvests, etc.) and systemic (economic crises, natural disasters, 
spikes in food prices, etc.); iii. income smoothing: that is, ensuring that a minimum level of consumption 
is  achieved  throughout  an  individual’s  life-cycle  (maternity/paternity  leave  and  retirement,  in 
particular).  Welfare  states  are  also  concerned  with  equity.
27  In  particular,  welfare  states  want  to 
equalize opportunities. Thus, the second main objective of the welfare state is supporting a minimum 
level of human capital accumulation --that is, ensuring that everyone has a minimum level of access to 
education and healthcare-- especially for the income poor.
28 Finally, welfare states are also concerned 
with egregious inequalities; in particular, inequalities arising from market failures, exploitative and 
predatory behavior or perverse social norms. 
 
                                                             
22 López-Calva and Lustig (2010).  
23 See, for example, Barros et al. (2007); Barros et al. in López-Calva and Lustig (2010); Esquivel et al. in López-Calva and Lustig 
(2010); and Fiszbein and Schady (2009 p.104-107).   
24 For example, these changes are present in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Peru in López-Calva and Lustig (2010). 
25  Barros et al. (2009 p. 12; 81; 88; 112; 114) highlight changes in policies for basic service provision that have improved access 
among the rural poor in Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru.   
26 See, for example, Barr (2004). 
27 See, for example, Barr (2004). 
28 These dimensions are consistent with poor people’s perceptions about poverty and the analytics of the multi-dimensionality of 
poverty. See, for example, Narayan et al. (2000), World Bank (2000/1) and Alkire and Santos (2010). One could add other dimensions 
such as building poor people’s access to basic infrastructure and/or housing. 8 
 
Governments  can  work  towards  supporting  a  minimum  living  standard  and  reducing  inequality 
through  four  main  channels:  taxes  and  transfers  (fiscal  policy);
29  non-budgetary/regulatory 
interventions;
30 redistribution of assets; and interventions that change the distribution of voice and 
power among different groups in society
31 and alter cultural norms.
32  Actions in these areas will 
affect poverty through two main channels: growth and distribution, either by their effect on market 
(primary) incomes and/or post-fiscal (after net transfers) incomes. CEQ confines its assessment to 
government efforts in fiscal policy (also called fiscal or budgetary interventions).  CEQ uses static 
incidence analysis; it does not include behavioral responses or general equilibrium effects.  
 
The welfare state not only improves equity but also improves efficiency.  For example, transfers can 
help the credit constrained poor to invest in human capital and thereby result in lower poverty and 
higher growth.
33  Directly producing or regulating certain social services can correct market failures 
in markets where information asymmetries are large (e.g., health care).
34  However, as economic 
theory also predicts, state interventions through taxes and transfers can have important efficiency 
costs. In these instances, there will be a trade-off between efficiency and equity. Fiscal interventions 
should be such that distortions are kept to a minimum; in particular, the financing and construction 
of benefits should not result in large negative incentives to labor supply, investment in human 
capital, saving, fertility, informality and private transfers. CEQ, thus, also assesses whether fiscal 
interventions are designed and implemented in ways that minimize distortions. 
   
In  addition  to  causing  microeconomic  distortions,  poorly  designed  or  badly  implemented  fiscal 
interventions can cause unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances. These imbalances can lead to 
economic downturns or crises that, in turn, result in large increases in poverty.
35 That is why tax and 
transfer policies should avoid cost explosions and unfunded spending commitments.  In addition, 
governments should collect sufficient revenues from sustainable sources (e.g., not rely on occasional 
windfalls from commodity booms).
36 CEQ assesses the extent to which the combination of tax and 
transfer policy is consistent with the overarching goal of macroeconomic stability. 
   
Finally, the success of fiscal interventions in reducing poverty and inequality requires having the 
ability to measure progress and having evaluation mechanisms to determine the effectiveness of 
                                                             
29 “Taxes” here refer to all government revenues (including “profits” from public sector enterprises); “transfers” refer to current 
expenditures and includes consumer subsidies. Depending on the country, it may include some producer subsidies, especially in 
agriculture. More precise definitions will be discussed below. 
30 For example, price controls, minimum wage policies, land reform, import or export restrictions, labor market regulations, and anti-
trust legislation and competitiveness policies. 
31 These include changes in fostering and supporting the mobilization of certain groups (landless peasants, informal workers, unions, 
women, ethnic minorities, etc.). 
32 Examples are campaigns to reduce fertility rates or denounce domestic violence. 
33 On the effect of credit constraints on poverty, inequality and growth see Aghion et al.(1997); Aghion and Howitt (1992) and 
Mookherjee and Ray (2003 and 2006). 
34 See Barr (2004). 
35 See, for example, Lustig (2000) and Ravallion (2008).  
36 See Birdsall et al. (2008). 9 
 
fiscal interventions. CEQ assesses the extent to which governments are accountable: that is, whether 
needed  information  is  produced  and  shared,  whether  there  are  mechanisms  to  independently 
validate this information and finally, whether there are mechanisms to independently evaluate the 
design and implementation of taxes and transfers. 
   
i.  Policy Instruments  
 
In  order  to  assess  and  quantify  the  impact  of  policies  and  programs,  we  must  identify  which 
redistributive  instruments
37  will  be  included  in  the  diagnostic  tool  and  organize  them  in  some 
fashion. There are four main types of redistributive instruments available to governments through 
fiscal policy: i) taxes on income, consumption and assets; ii) monetary transfers; iii) subsidies to 
consumption goods, inputs and credit (including tax expenditures); and iv) in-kind transfers through 
the fully or partially subsidized provision of goods and services particularly in the area of education 
and health. 
 
Specifically, CEQ will attempt to be as comprehensive as possible in assessing government efforts 
on both the revenue and spending sides. The menu of policies and programs is vast: direct and 
indirect taxes (e.g., sales tax and VAT); monetary transfers; subsidies to consumption (e.g., housing, 
food, fuel and VAT exemptions) and inputs (e.g., fertilizers, improved seeds and credit); in-kind 
transfers such as national (and sub-national when appropriate) spending in: education including pre-
primary, primary, lower secondary, (upper) secondary, and tertiary; day care services; early childhood 
programs; youth programs; scholarships; student credit programs (subsidy component); fee waivers; 
pensions  (subsidized  component);  health  for  the  insured  and  uninsured  population  (subsidized 
component); housing subsidies; school feeding programs; targeted food subsidies; and rural roads, 
electricity, water and sanitation in poor regions and neighborhoods. Some of the transfers will take 
the form of investments (e.g., rural roads, electricity grids, drainage, schools, health facilities, etc.) 
but  almost  all  are  recurrent  expenditures  (e.g.,  teachers’  and  doctors’  salaries,  educational  and 
medical inputs, etc.).  CEQ will quantify and assess the impact of the most significant policies and 
programs on the income poverty and human capital poverty gaps, and on inequality.
38 
 
                                                             
37 “Redistributive” here refers to state actions and policies that can potentially result in a more equal distribution of income. 
38 Examples of policies: tax systems, public education systems, public health systems, pension systems, price subsidies, price support 
systems,  subsidies  to  specific  sectors  (e.g.,  agriculture),  to  mention  the  most  important.  Examples  of  programs:  conditional  or 
unconditional cash transfer programs; workfare or employment (or employment guarantee) programs; programs to protect poor 
households from the financial impact of illness, disability or death; programs to provide non-contributory health insurance; programs 
to prevent people from falling into poverty during old age; programs or policies specifically addressed to building human capital and 
assets of the poor; early childhood development programs for poor children; programs for pregnant and lactating poor women; 
programs for poor youth at risk; programs to increase school attendance of the poor (e.g., scholarships, school feeding programs, 
CCTs); programs to improve the poor’s nutrition and health (e.g., food coupons, subsidized basic foodstuffs, nutritional supplements, 
etc.); programs to improve the poor’s access to housing; programs to improve the poor’s access to energy (e.g., differential prices); 
programs to improve the poor’s access to credit and private insurance; programs to empower the poor; programs to reduce social 
exclusion and discrimination; programs to support ethnic minorities; programs to empower women; programs to achieve other 
socially desirable objectives. 10 
 
ii.  The Design of CEQ 
 
CEQ  consists  of  a  diagnostic  framework  which  helps  identify  the  main  causes  and  constraints 
(successful fiscal interventions) that prevent a country from achieving (enable a country to achieve) a 
universal  minimum  standard  of  living  and  reducing  inequality  in  ways  that  are  consistent  with 
macroeconomic and microeconomic efficiency. A diagnostic framework follows a logical sequence 
to  identify  or  discard  factors  that  may  be  either  obstacles  or  crucial  to  achieving  a  particular 
objective or essential to understanding a specific phenomenon.  Diagnostic exercises usually rely on 
a combination of predictions from theory, rigorous empirical evidence, practical knowledge and 
what we call “common sense.”  The diagnostic approach has been widely used to identify the 
binding constraints for economic growth.
39  CEQ is one of the first attempts to apply it to a social 
equity goal. In broad terms, one would like to know whether a government: i. has enough resources 
and allocates them well enough to meet social equity policy objectives; ii. has appropriate policies 
and  programs  and  collects  and  distributes  resources  equitably;  iii.  ensures  spending  is  fiscally 
responsible  and  that  programs  minimize  distortions  and  negative  incentives;    iv.  collects  and 
publishes relevant information, as well as subjects itself to independent evaluations.  For simplicity, 
these criteria are called: resources, equity, quality and accountability and they are defined as follows: 
 
Resources 
•  Assess  whether  government  revenues  and  redistributive  spending  are  potentially 
sufficient with what would be required for supporting a minimum standard of living.
 40 
Equity 
•  Assess whether the actual level and allocation of redistributive spending as well as the 
range,  design  and  implementation  of  programs  and  policies  are  consistent  with 
supporting a minimum standard of living.  
Quality 
•  Assess whether the design and implementation of programs and policies
41 to support a 
minimum  standard  of  living  are  broadly  consistent  with  macroeconomic  and 
microeconomic  efficiency  and  whether  the  programs  and  policies  implemented  have 
high social returns as well as are cost-effective, of high quality and incentive compatible. 
Accountability 
•  Assess  the  degree  of  accountability  and  transparency  with  respect  to  programs  and 
policies designed to support a minimum standard of living. 
 
 
In sum, CEQ is among the first frameworks to assess social policy –or, rather, public policy with 
social equity objectives—comprehensively and to make the assessment comparable across countries 
                                                             
39 Hausmann et al. (2006), Rodrik (2007) and Hausmann et al. (2008). 
40 For definitions, see section 6. 
41 Throughout this section, “programs” refers to programs designed to support a minimum standard of living and “policies” refers to 
policies designed to support a minimum standard of living  11 
 
and able to be translated into a performance index. CEQ is based on extensive research and expert 
opinion that give it high content validity.
42 In particular, the diagnostic framework and indicators for 
CEQ are selected according to existing analysis of what is constituted as essential to achieving 
significant reductions in poverty and inequality through fiscal policy. The following sections present 
the diagnostic framework and questionnaire. Section 6 includes the definitions of variables and 
indicators. 
 
While CEQ may have some similarities to international benchmarking exercises such as the World 
Economic  Forum’s  “Global  Competitiveness  Report”
43  and  the  World  Bank’s  “Doing  Business 
Indicators,”
44 there is an important difference. First, it relies on an in-depth tax and benefit incidence 
analysis  rather  than  on  mainly  secondary  sources  and/or  perceptions  and  opinions.  Second, 
international  benchmarking  exercises  such  as  the  Global  Competitiveness  Index  classify  as 
“positives” areas where a country performs better than the average for the reference group and as 
“negatives” those areas where it underperforms.  As noted by Hausmann et al. (2008), however, it is 
quite  possible  that  over-performance  in  some  areas  by  a  particular  country  may  actually  mean 
underperformance vis-à-vis its own optimal or desirable outcome.  In contrast, CEQ is based on a 
diagnostic framework that allows us to identify the binding constraints (or the crucial contributing 
factors) to achieving a goal regardless of whether the indicator in question is above or below the 
average for the group of reference. For example, a government may be allocating a larger share of 
GDP to redistributive spending than the average for its reference group and yet the amount spent 
may be insufficient to ensure a minimum living standard for its population. In this case, CEQ will 
classify it as a “negative” and will attempt a systematic search for the fundamental cause of why, if 
resources are potentially sufficient, the after net transfers poverty gap is still greater than zero. 
 
iii.  Diagnostic Framework  
 
In order to understand the diagnostic framework, the best is to visualize it as a diagnostic tree as in 
Figure  3.  Let  us  consider  the  first  objective  of  the  welfare  state:  supporting  a  minimum  living 
standard for all.  If that objective were met, the disposable income poverty gap ratio measure with 
an agreed upon extreme poverty line would equal zero.  If it is zero, two situations may arise: the 
market income (income before net transfers) poverty gap ratio is very low to begin with—that is, the 
country is an equity success story-- or, if it isn’t, the state made substantial effort to reduce the 
poverty gap through fiscal policy.  Of course, if a country is already successful, the direct impact of 
fiscal policy becomes irrelevant (unless it makes things worse).  Understanding the causes for this 
kind of success is very important but CEQ would not be the appropriate instrument.  Instead, if the 
country’s  success  is  determined  by  direct  fiscal  policy,  CEQ  will  help  unveil  which  specific 
interventions  account  for  success  and  why.  Likewise,  if  the  government  is  not  successful  in 
                                                             
42 For more on content validity see Morra Imas and Rist (2009 p. 294); Adcock and Collier (2001). 
43 www.gcr.weforum.org. 
44 www.doingbusiness.org. 12 
 
supporting a minimum living standard after taxes and transfers, CEQ will help identify the causes of 
failure and policy actions to improve the government’s performance. 
 




Suppose that, as in most developing countries, the disposable income poverty gap ratio is not zero.  
There are a number of reasons why that might be the case.  In searching for the causes, we follow a 
logical sequence that will help us to identify the contributing factors and binding constraints. The 
first reason why the poverty gap is not zero might be that the government either collects too little 
revenue and/or spends too little for redistributive purposes.  We can check that by comparing total 
revenues and total redistributive spending (defined below) with the before net transfers poverty gap 
(that is, the poverty gap estimated with market income).  If it turns out that either or both are the 
cause, the next step is to check whether this is so because the country is too poor, the government’s 13 
 
capacity  to  tax  is  too  low  or  public  spending  is  on  other  items  (military  expenditures  or  debt 
servicing, for example).   
 
In middle-income countries like most of the countries in Latin America, insufficient total fiscal 
resources  or  redistributive  expenditures  are  not  likely  to  be  a  cause  for  the  disposable  income 
poverty gap not being equal to zero.   Even if enough resources are spent on redistributive programs 
and policies, redistributive spending allocated to the poor might not be enough to close the poverty 
gap.  There  are  at  least  four  –and  not  mutually  exclusive—causes  for  this.    First,  redistributive 
spending is regressive or not progressive enough.  Second, regardless of how much is allocated to 
the non-poor –and, even if what is allocated to the poor is potentially sufficient--, the poverty gap 
may not be zero because the safety net system does not cover the universe of the poor
45; third, the 




In turn, the reasons mentioned above may be the result of several factors.  The safety net system 
may  benefit  the  non-poor  or  leave  out  some  poor  households  intentionally.    For  example, 
“universal”  social  security  systems  often  do  not  include  agricultural  workers  and  housekeepers.  
Cash transfers to the poor exclude households without children, individuals who are below the age 
of 65, or undocumented migrants. Second, the design of programs may have unintended effects. For 
example, the participation costs may be too high for the poorest of the poor; or, the eligibility cut-
off and amount transferred are not adjusted for differences in prices across regions within a country. 
Third, in practice the programs may leave out eligible individuals and include non-eligible individuals 
due to corruption, clientelistic politics or honest mistakes. 
 
In the literature, the share of poor who do not receive benefits of safety net programs are called 
errors of exclusion and the share of non-poor beneficiaries are called errors of inclusion. However, 
we consider that it is useful to classify the “errors” of inclusion and exclusion into two groups: 
intentional  and  unintended  errors  of  exclusion  and  inclusion.    For  simplicity,  we  shall  call  the 
intentional exclusion of the poor and inclusion of the non-poor as exclusion and leakage by design.  
The unintended errors will be called errors of exclusion and errors of inclusion. The latter could be 
caused  by  unintended  failures  in  design  or  implementation  of  programs  such  as  higher  than 
anticipated  participation  costs,  deficient  information  systems,  clientelistic  politics  or  corruption, 
underestimation of geographic isolation, higher than expected administrative costs, unanticipated 
leakages, lack of accrediting documentation among potential beneficiaries, or self-exclusion, among 
other factors.  
 
                                                             
45 Transfers could bring a portion of the poor way above the poverty line, for example, and yet leave some of the poor 
by design. 
46 Of course, another reason may be that direct taxes are not sufficiently progressive. 14 
 
4.  CEQ: Diagnostic Questionnaire  
 
Policy Objective: Government makes substantial fiscal efforts to support a minimum 
standard of living and build the human capital of the poor in ways that reduce overall 
inequality and are broadly consistent with fiscal sustainability and economic efficiency  
Criteria: resources, equity, quality and accountability  
 
Step 1: Calculate basic indicators to determine whether goals are achieved (see section 6). 
 
Step 2: After calculating the basic indicators, are the after net transfers income and human 
capital poverty gaps
47 (poverty gaps, from now onwards) zero?
  
   
  If yes: => proceed to Step 3. 
 
  If no: => proceed to Step 5. 
 
Step 3: If poverty gaps are zero (i.e., poverty is eradicated), which of the following factors 
explain this success? 
 
a.  High economic growth and/or equitable (pro-poor) economic growth. 
b.  Fiscal resources are sufficient and equitably collected and distributed. (To comment 
on this item, complete section E2 below) 
 
Step 4: If the poverty gaps are zero, sections E2-E5 are designed to assess the contribution 
of the progressivity of net transfers, coverage of the poor, size of net transfers to the poor, 
and progressivity of net transfers among the poor, respectively, to achieving the goal of 
closing the poverty gaps. => Proceed to E2. 
 
Step 5: If the poverty gaps are not zero, is it because total government revenues fall short 
and/or because the government does not allocate sufficient budgetary resources for 
redistributive spending purposes? => Proceed to R1 
 
RESOURCES: Assess whether government revenues and redistributive spending are 
potentially
48 sufficient with what would be required for supporting a minimum standard of 
living. 
 
R1. Revenue Collection Effort   
 
R1.1    Does the government collect sufficient combined resources to close the: i. before net 
transfers income poverty gap (market income poverty gap); ii. before net transfers human 
                                                             
47 For definitions of net transfers poverty gaps see section 6 of this handbook.   
48 For definitions, see Section 6. 15 
 
capital gap; and, iii. before net transfers overall poverty gap, both in normal times and in the 
event of systemic shocks?
49  
 
R1.2   Are total revenues and tax revenues (as a percent of GDP) consistent with the 
country’s GDP per capita?
50 
 
If the answer to R1.1 is yes, => proceed to question R2. If not, => proceed to R1.3. 
 
R1.3  Explain why the government does not collect sufficient combined resources to close 
the i. before net transfers income poverty gap (market income poverty gap); ii. before net 
transfers human capital gap; and, iii. before net transfers overall poverty gap. Is it due to:
51 
 
a.  Low per capita income? 
b.  Low capacity to tax/raise revenues? In turn, is the low capacity to tax due to: 
i.  Political economy dynamics? 
ii.  Institutional inefficiency? 
iii.  Other (specify)? 
c.  Other (specify)? 
 
R2. Redistributive Spending Effort 
 
R2.1    Does the government allocate sufficient budgetary resources for redistributive 
spending purposes to potentially close the: i. before net transfers income poverty gap 
(market income poverty gap); ii. before net transfers human capital gap; and, iii. before net 
transfers overall poverty gap, both in normal times and in the event of systemic shocks?  
 
R2.2  Are total government spending and social spending (as a percent of GDP) consistent 
with the country’s GDP per capita?
52 
 
If the answer to R2.1 is yes, => proceed to Step 7 (Equity section). If not, => proceed to 
R2.3 and then to Step 6. 
 
R2.3    Explain why the government does not allocate sufficient budgetary resources for 
redistributive spending purposes to potentially close the: i. before net transfers income 
poverty gap (market income poverty gap); ii. before net transfers human capital gap; and, iii. 
before net transfers overall poverty gap, both in normal times and in the event of systemic 
shocks. Is it due to: 
 
                                                             
49 During systemic shocks a government may choose to use reserves or contingency funds.  This should be counted as 
part of the total resources to smooth the impact of systemic adverse shocks. 
50 The answer to this question will depend on benchmarks that can be provided upon request.  
51 Throughout the questionnaire, the answers to a question such as “Is it due to…?” should be explained. For example, 
if political economy dynamics are identified as a cause for low capacity to tax, identify which dynamics and why. 
52 The answer to this question will depend on benchmarks that can be provided upon request. 16 
 
a.  Subsidies to other sectors? 
b.  Overblown administration? 
c.  A large debt burden?  
d.  High military spending? 
e.  Political economy dynamics? 
f.  Other (specify)? 
 
Step 6: If the poverty gaps are not zero and the government’s total fiscal revenue and/or 
redistributive spending are not sufficient to close the poverty gap, poverty reduction might 
still be lower than it could be with the given redistributive spending. Sections E2 
(progressivity of net transfers), E3 (coverage of the poor by safety net system
53) and E4 
(generosity of net transfers to the poor) are designed to identify policy actions that could 
further reduce poverty even when existing resources are insufficient. => Proceed to E2. 
 
Step 7: If the government allocates sufficient budgetary resources for redistributive 
spending purposes, why is the poverty gap not zero?  There could be several reasons: the 
share of redistributive spending going to the poor is insufficient; coverage of the poor is not 
universal; generosity of net transfers to the poor is too low; progressivity of transfers among 
the poor is too low. => Proceed to the Equity section. 
 
EQUITY: Assess whether the actual level and allocation of redistributive spending as well 
as the range, design and implementation of programs and policies are consistent with 
supporting a minimum standard of living.  
 
E1.  Allocation of Redistributive Spending to the Poor 
 
E1.1  Is the proportion of redistributive spending allocated to closing the before net 
transfers poverty gaps (on anti-poverty programs, basic education, basic health care, etc. as 
specified in public sector budget) sufficient, both in normal times and in the event of 
systemic shocks? 
 
Step 8: If the goal of closing the poverty gaps is not achieved because the share of 
redistributive spending allocated to the poor is insufficient, E2 seeks to assess whether net 
transfers are not sufficiently progressive (in particular, because net transfers to the non-poor 
are too large). If the goal is not achieved but the share of redistributive spending allocated 
to the poor is sufficient, E2 seeks to assess the progressivity of the system. In either case, 
=> proceed to E2.  
 
E2. Progressivity of Net Transfers 
   
                                                             
53Safety net system here can include redistributive programs not included under social spending. 17 
 
  E2.1  Are net transfers to the non-poor too large?  To answer this question, estimate the 
amount and proportion of net transfers that reach the non-poor (based on household 
surveys and public sector budget). Is what remains insufficient to close the poverty gap? 
 
  E2.2   How equalizing/unequalizing is the distribution of net transfers? To answer this 
question, calculate the incidence of net transfers for specific programs,
54 policies, taxes,
55 and 
overall by: i. quantiles;
56 ii. poor vs. non-poor; and iii. other groupings. Calculate Suits and 




a.  What is the progressivity of the tax (revenue-raising) system, total government 
spending, redistributive spending and net transfers overall?  
b.  What proportion of transfers for specific programs, total monetary transfers, policies 
(for example, education and health spending) and overall (the sum of all monetary 
and in-kind transfers) accrues to: i. the non-poor; ii. the middle range;
58 and iii. the 
richest 20, 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent?
59 
c.  What is the average size of per capita net transfers going to: i. the non-poor; ii. the 
middle range; and iii. the richest 20, 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent? 
d.  How much of cash transfers (individually for flagship programs and combined for all 
cash transfers) goes to i. the bottom 20% and ii. the bottom 40% of the income 
distribution? This should be expressed in absolute terms (the value of transfers in 
local currency units), as a proportion of total cash transfers, and as a percent of 
GDP. 
e.  Which programs and policies are: i. progressive in absolute terms? ii. progressive in 
relative terms; iii. neutral; iv. regressive? 
f.  What proportion of total redistributive spending is allocated to programs that are: i. 
progressive in absolute terms? ii. progressive in relative terms; iii. neutral; iv. 
regressive? 
g.  Are income tax revenues and taxes on wealth (as a percent of GDP) consistent with 
the country’s GDP per capita?
60 
h.  What proportion of taxes is paid by: i. the non-poor; ii. the middle range; iii. the 
richest 20, 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent? 
                                                             
54 Some surveys do not include questions directly asking about specific program benefits that a household might have 
received. There are three methods to determine whether a household received transfers from a specific program and 
quantify the benefits. See the “Definitions” subsection of Technical Definitions of Variables. 
55 Indicate whether the tax data is included in the survey or if it must be imputed, and if so, how it is imputed. 
56 Quantiles ideally should be centiles. If that is not feasible, use the smallest feasible quantile (by 5 percent, deciles and 
quintiles). 
57 The benefit/tax incidence curves are analogous to the growth incidence curves but include the change in per capita 
income before and after net transfers in the y-axis (instead of growth in per capita income between two points in time). 
58 The boundaries for middle range should be given by the non-poor that are not in the top 10 percent. 
59 The feasible level of disaggregation will depend on the representativeness of the surveys used for the calculations. 
60 The answer to this question will depend on benchmarks that can be provided upon request. 18 
 
i.  Which taxes and revenue-raising mechanisms are: i. progressive; ii. neutral; iii. 
regressive in absolute terms; iv. regressive in relative terms? 
j.  What proportion of taxes/government revenues is: i. progressive; ii. neutral; iii. 
regressive in absolute terms; iv. regressive in relative terms? 
k.  Do government spending patterns significantly reduce inequality in access to and 
quality of services (including inequality between genders, ethnic/racial groups, 
socioeconomic groups and geographic locations)? 
l.  What proportion of flagship program and policy beneficiaries is: i. non-poor; ii. 
middle range; and iii. rich?
61 
m.  What proportion of i. the non-poor, ii. the middle range and iii. the richest 20, 10, 5, 
1 and 0.1 percent are flagship program and policy beneficiaries? 
n.  What impact has each flagship program and policy (individually and combined) had 
on inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient)? 
o.  What is the simulated impact of each flagship program and policy (individually and 
combined) on inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient), if there was perfect 
coverage and no leakages according to the program’s eligibility rules? 
p.  How does the impact of each flagship program and policy (individually and 
combined) compare to the simulated impact on inequality, assuming perfect coverage 
and no leakages according to the program’s eligibility rules? 
q.  Which programs and policies have the greatest benefits to the non-poor by design: 
formal sector insurance schemes, price subsidies, etc.? 
r.  Which programs and policies have the greatest benefits to the poor by design? 
s.  Which socioeconomic groups receive the bulk of net transfers going to the non-poor 
for specific programs, policies, taxes and overall? Possible groups include the near 
poor, low-income urban workers, corporatist unions, rent-seeking elites, etc. 
t.  Which socioeconomic groups do not pay their “expected” share of taxes? 
 
E2.3   If the distribution of net transfers is not sufficiently equalizing, is it due to: 
 
a.  “Universalistic” welfare systems (by design, everybody has the right to a benefit and 
hence benefits going to the poor are too small)? 
b.  State-capture by ruling elites? 
c.  Distribution rules or patterns among federal and sub-national governments? 
d.  Other (specify)? 
 
E2.4  Are benefits to the non-poor by design (i.e., intentional), or are there errors of 
inclusion (i.e., unintended beneficiaries receive benefits)? If there are errors of inclusion, are 
they due to: 
 
                                                             
61 Calculate for the richest 20, 10, 5, 1 and 0.1 percent. 19 
 
a.  Unintended shortcomings in the diagnostic, design, dissemination and/or 
implementation of existing policies and programs? 
b.  Clientelistic politics and/or corruption?  
c.  Shortcomings in targeting mechanisms?  
d.  Other (specify)? 
 
E2.5  Which programs and policies with large benefits to the non-poor should be kept, and 
which should be downsized, reformed or eliminated? Why? 
 
Step 9: If redistributive spending allocated to the poor is sufficient to close the poverty gaps, 
E3 seeks to assess whether poverty gaps are not zero because coverage of the poor is not 
universal. If redistributive spending allocated to the poor is not sufficient to close the 
poverty gap, E3 seeks to assess what would happen under the hypothetical situation that 
resources allocated to the poor were raised to the sufficient level; would the range of existing 
safety net programs cover the universe of the poor? => Proceed to E3 
 
E3. Coverage of the Poor 
 
E3.1  Is coverage sufficient? To answer this question, list all the relevant redistributive 
programs and policies
62 (examples listed in footnote and section 6; be sure to include 
programs that help the poor cope with the effects of systemic shocks such as natural 
disasters, economic crises, epidemics, rising food and fuel prices, etc.).  Then, estimate the 
following for each program and policy, or at least for the flagship program(s) and main 
policies (specify which programs and/or policies will be assessed), individually and 
combined: 
 
a.  What is the coverage rate among the poor? Is it close to 100 percent? 
b.  What is the coverage rate among relevant sub-groups within the poor (women, 
children, elderly, ethnic minorities, youth at risk, etc.)? Is it close to 100 percent? 
                                                             
62 The list should include all relevant policies and programs even if not all of them will be subject to the detailed analysis 
included  in  the  CEQ.  Examples  of  programs:  conditional  or  unconditional  cash  transfer  programs;  workfare  or 
employment (or employment guarantee) programs; programs to protect poor households from the financial impact of 
illness, disability or death; programs to provide non-contributory health insurance; programs to prevent people from 
falling into poverty during old age; programs or policies specifically addressed to building human capital and assets of 
the poor; early childhood development programs for poor children; programs for pregnant and lactating poor women; 
programs for poor youth at risk; programs to increase school attendance of the poor (e.g., scholarships, school feeding 
programs, CCTs); programs to improve the poor’s nutrition and health (e.g., food coupons, subsidized basic foodstuffs, 
nutritional supplements, etc.); programs to improve the poor’s access to housing; programs to improve the poor’s access 
to energy (e.g., differential prices); programs to improve the poor’s access to credit and private insurance; programs to 
empower  the  poor;  programs  to  reduce  social  exclusion  and  discrimination;  programs  to  support/empower  ethnic 
minorities; programs to empower women; programs to achieve other socially desirable objectives.  Examples of policies: 
tax systems, public education systems, public health systems, pension systems, price subsidies, price support systems, 
subsidies to specific sectors (e.g., agriculture). 20 
 
c.  If coverage is not close to 100 percent, what are the characteristics of the excluded 
(after net transfers) poor? 
 
If coverage is close to 100 percent, explain what accounts for this success and proceed to 
E4. If coverage is not close to 100 percent, proceed to E3.2. 
 
E3.2  If program/policy coverage is not close to 100 percent, what is the cause? 
 
a.  Does the combination of programs, safety nets and social policies jointly cover all 
the groups in need of assistance? For example: 
i.  The chronic poor. 
ii.  The transient poor. 
iii.  Those in danger of falling below the poverty line after a systemic shock. 
iv.  Those affected by reforms. 
v.  The vulnerable (pregnant and lactating women, the elderly, youth at risk, 
etc.). 
vi.  The socially excluded. 
vii.  Groups suffering from discrimination. 
viii.  Other (specify).  
b.  Do programs and policies leave out some of the poor by design (intentionally)? Who 
are they (for example, poor households without children or senior citizens, young 
adults, undocumented migrants, etc.)? 
c.  Why are poor people left out by design (intentionally)? 
i.   Political reasons.  
ii.    To leave out “undeserving” groups. 
iii.    Discrimination. 
iv.    To minimize negative incentive effects. 
v.   To ensure fiscal sustainability. 
vi.   Fiscal austerity. 
vii.   Other (specify). 
d.  Is there a limit to the number of beneficiaries that can enroll in the flagship 
programs?  If so: 
i.    Is that limit below the total number of eligible households? 
ii.    Is that limit below the total number of poor households? 
iii.    Is there a waiting list of eligible households that are not receiving program 
benefits? If so: 
iv.    How many households are on the waiting list (in absolute terms, as a 
proportion of current beneficiaries, and as a proportion of eligible 
households)? 
e.  If the poor are left out unintentionally, what explains the errors of 
exclusion/shortcomings in targeting? 
i.  Inadvertent gaps in the range of programs and policies. 
ii.  Unintended shortcomings in the design, dissemination and/or 
implementation of programs. 
iii.  Unintentional consequences of rules regarding the distribution of resources 
among subnational governments. 21 
 
iv.  Administrative weaknesses. 
v.  Clientelistic policies and/or corruption. 
vi.  Geographic isolation of certain poor groups. 
vii.  Lack of accrediting documentation. 
viii.  Lack of infrastructure. 
ix.  Other (specify). 
f.  Do safety net programs designed to protect the poor during systemic shocks 
(economic downturns, escalating food prices, natural disasters, etc.) exist? Do 
programs and policies have the capacity to increase the number of beneficiaries in 
the event of systemic shocks?  
 
E3.3  Does the government make efforts to increase access of traditionally excluded or 
discriminated-against groups (afro-descendants, indigenous people, youth at risk, women, 
etc.) to: 
 
a.  Antipoverty programs? 
b.  Education? 
c.  Affordable health care? 
d.  The labor force? 
e.  Equal pay? 
f.  High-quality jobs? 
g.  Other (specify)? 
   
E3.4  What groups are more likely to be poor before and after transfers?
63 In particular: 
 
i.  What groups are more likely to be poor before net transfers? 
ii.  What groups are more likely to be excluded (or not receive sufficient transfers to 
escape from poverty) from transfer programs? 
 
E3.5  What impact has each flagship program and policy had (individually and combined) 
on the headcount index, poverty gap ratio, and squared poverty gap ratio? 
 
a.  What is the simulated impact of each flagship program and policy (individually and 
combined) on the headcount index, poverty gap ratio, and squared poverty gap ratio, 
if there was perfect coverage and no leakages according to the program’s eligibility 
rules? 
b.  How does the impact of each flagship program and policy (individually and 
combined) compare to the simulated impact on the headcount index, poverty gap 
ratio, and squared poverty gap ratio, assuming perfect coverage and no leakages 
according to the program’s eligibility rules? 
c.  How does the impact of each flagship program and policy (individually and 
combined) compare to the potential impact on the headcount index, poverty gap ratio, 
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and squared poverty gap ratio, assuming perfect targeting and complete coverage of 
the target population? 
 
E3.6  Which policies and programs should be implemented or reformed to increase 
coverage among the poor? How? 
 
Step 10: If redistributive spending allocated to the poor is sufficient to close the poverty 
gaps, E4 seeks to assess whether the size of transfers to some of the poor is not large 
enough to bring them out of poverty. If redistributive spending allocated to the poor is not 
sufficient to close the poverty gaps, E4 seeks to assess what would happen under the 
hypothetical situation that resources allocated to the poor were raised to the sufficient level; 
would the size of transfers to some of the poor remain too small to bring them out of 
poverty? 
 
E4. Generosity of Net Transfers Among the Poor 
 
E4.1  Do net transfers per beneficiary to the poor fall short of what is needed to close the 
poverty gaps? To answer this question, estimate the average net transfers to the poor (per 
poor person) and the average poverty gap. How do they compare? 
 
If net transfers per beneficiary to the poor do not fall short of what is needed to close the 
poverty gaps, explain what accounts for this success and proceed to E5. If they do fall short, 
proceed to E4.2. 
 
E4.2  Does the design of programs and policies intentionally keep net transfers below 
sufficient levels? If yes, why? 
 
a.  Scarcity of resources. 
b.  To minimize negative incentive effects. 
c.  To ensure fiscal sustainability. 
d.  Fiscal Austerity. 
e.  Other (specify). 
 
E4.3  Do net transfers to the poor fall short due to unintended shortcomings in program 
and policy allocation rules or budgetary decisions? If so, are they due to: 
 
a.  Administrative costs? 
b.  Rules regarding the distribution of resources among national and subnational 
governments? 
c.  Not adjusting the magnitude of transfers in the face of systemic shocks? 
d.  Other (specify)? 
 
E4.4   Do net transfers fall short because the tax, fees and/or co-payments burden or other 
factors (such as transportation or labor opportunity costs) on the poor lower the real value 
of net transfers? 23 
 
 
a.  What would the poverty gap be if the poor paid zero direct and indirect taxes, fees 
and co-payments? 
b.  Which revenue-raising categories within the tax, fees and co-payments system place 
the highest burden on the poor? 
c.  Which revenue-raising categories should be downsized, reformed or eliminated to 
decrease the tax, fees and co-payments burden on the poor? Why and how? 
 
E4.5  Which policies and programs should be implemented or reformed to increase the 
size of net transfers to the poor who remain in poverty? Why and how? 
 
Step 11: If redistributive spending allocated to the poor is sufficient to close the poverty 
gaps, E5 seeks to assess whether the progressivity of transfers among the poor is such that 
some do not escape poverty. If redistributive spending allocated to the poor is not sufficient 
to close the poverty gaps, E5 seeks to assess what would happen under the hypothetical 
situation that resources allocated to the poor were raised to the sufficient level; would the 
progressivity of transfers still prevent some of the poor from escaping poverty? 
 
E.5 Progressivity of Net Transfers Among the Poor 
 
E5.1  Are net transfers among the poor sufficiently progressively distributed? In particular: 
 
a.  What is the distribution of benefits among the poor? Estimate the squared after net 
transfers poverty gap ratio, after transfers poverty gaps among the poor by quantile 
and benefits incidence curves among the poor by quantile. 
b.  If net transfers among the poor are not sufficiently progressive, is it due to: 
i.  Administrative weaknesses? 
ii.  Mistakes in the design, dissemination and/or implementation of existing 
programs? 
iii.  Clientelistic policies and/or corruption? 
iv.  Rules regarding the distribution of resources among national and subnational 
governments disadvantage areas with the poorest of the poor? 
v.  The poorest of the poor suffer from systemic shocks more frequently, are hit 
harder by systemic shocks and/or are more likely to suffer systemic shocks, 
and the program or policy does not adjust the magnitude of transfers in the 
face of systemic shocks. 
vi.  Other (specify)? 
 
  E5.2   Are the tax, fees and/or co-payments burdens or other factors (such as 
transportation or labor opportunity costs) on the poor higher for the poorest of the poor? 
 24 
 
a.  What would the squared poverty gap ratio be if the poor paid zero direct and indirect 
taxes, fees and co-payments? How does this compare with the (after transfers)
64 
squared poverty gap otherwise? 
b.  Which revenue-raising categories within the tax, fees and co-payments system place a 
higher burden on the poorest of the poor? 
c.  Which revenue-raising categories should be downsized, reformed or eliminated to 
decrease the tax, fees and co-payments burden on the poorest of the poor? Why and 
how? 
     
  E5.3  Which policies and programs should be implemented or reformed to increase the 
progressivity of net transfers among the poor? Why and how? 
 
Step 12: Proceed to the Quality section. 
 
QUALITY: Assess whether the design and implementation of programs and policies
65 to 
support a minimum standard of living are broadly consistent with macroeconomic and 
microeconomic efficiency and whether the programs and policies implemented have high 
social returns as well as are cost-effective, of high quality and incentive compatible. 
 
Q1. Macroeconomic Efficiency 
 
Q1.1   Is spending on programs consistent with broader goals of macroeconomic stability 
and growth? In particular: 
 
  a.  Are the costs of programs likely to be kept within reasonable bounds and not to 
become explosive? 
  b.  Are contributory and non-contributory social insurance systems sustainable? 
 
Q1.2  Does the government fund their spending on programs with non-distortionary taxes 
and not with windfalls from exceptional conditions (commodity price booms, proceeds from 
privatization, etc.), inflation tax, unsustainable (domestic or external) debt or by cutting 
resources available for other programs that benefit the poor and vulnerable? 
 
Q1.3    Does the government have fiscal space to implement counter-cyclical policies? If yes, 
does it use it? 
 
Q1.4  In the face of fiscal austerity, is spending on the poor relatively protected from cuts?  
 
Q2.  Microeconomic Efficiency 
 
                                                             
64 If an individual program or policy is being analyzed, “after transfers” refers only to the transfers from that program. 
65 Unless specified otherwise, throughout this section, “programs” refers to programs designed to support a minimum 
standard of living and “policies” refers to policies designed to support a minimum standard of living.  25 
 
Q2.1  Does the range of anti-poverty programs include those we know have the highest 
social rates of return (for example, programs which increase the human capital of poor 
children, reduce the incidence of crime, create local forward and backward linkages, make 
credit constraints for the poor non-binding, etc.)? 
 
Q2.2    Do the programs’ actual social rates of return meet expectations?  
 
Q2.3  Are programs and policies incentive compatible? In particular, are negative incentive 
effects on labor supply, investment in human capital, saving, fertility, informality, private 
transfers, migration, etc. small?   
 
Q2.4  Are programs cost-effective?  In particular: 
 
  a.  Are leakages (in terms of beneficiaries and benefits) to non-intended groups small 
compared with international averages? 
  b.  Are operational costs as a percentage of the total budget within the range of 
international averages?  
 
Q2.5  Are programs and policies of high quality? In particular: 
 
  a.  Are independent evaluations of programs positive? 
  b.  Are the results of independent program evaluations used to change the programs’ 
design, implementation and resource allocation (including salaries of service 
providers)? 
  c.  What is the quality of social services for the poor in relation to the average quality of 
social services in the country and in relation to international standards? 
  d.  Does the government employ competent staff and pay competitive salaries for the 
design, implementation and evaluation of antipoverty programs and social services 
for the poor? 
  e.  Do programs designed to support a minimum standard of living have adequate and 
clear eligibility criteria and, when applicable, an “exit” strategy? 
 
Q2.6  Are the mechanisms for allocation of resources and selection of beneficiaries 
sufficiently robust to protect the program from political manipulation and corruption?  
 
a.  Does a register of beneficiaries exist that can be audited and evaluated?  
b.  Does  beneficiary  selection  depend  on  objective  indicators  that  cannot  be 
manipulated,  such  as  numeric  scores  (i.e.  a  means  test  or  proxy  means  test)  or 
poverty mapping?  
c.  Is the only justification for removal from the program if conditions are not fulfilled 
or if the beneficiary is no longer within the target population (for example, a child 
graduates from school)? 
d.  Do transparent mechanisms exist to transmit complains and offer suggestions? 




Q2.7  Is the tax and subsidy system broadly non-distortionary (in terms of productive and 
allocative efficiency)? 
 
Q2.8  Are negative incentive effects of the tax system (and other revenue sources) on labor 
supply, investment in human capital, saving, fertility, informality, private transfers, migration, 
etc. small? 
 
Q2.9  Is the tax productivity for direct and indirect taxes consistent with OECD standards? 
 
Q2.10  Are negative incentive effects of programs not addressed to the poor (subsidies to 
industry and agriculture, for example) on labor supply, investment in human capital, saving, 
fertility, informality, private transfers, migration, etc. small? 
 
Step 13: Proceed to the Accountability section. 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY: Assess the degree of accountability and transparency with respect to 
programs and policies designed to support a minimum standard of living. 
 
A1. Evaluation Systems 
 
A1.1  Does the country have credible mechanisms to do evidence-based program 
evaluations?  
 
A1.2  Are independent evaluations an administrative or legal requirement of all programs 
and policies implemented by the government? 
 
A1.3  In the case of in-kind transfers, are there independently validated indicators of 
quality for government services?  
 
A1.4  Is the tax system subject to independent evaluations to determine the efficiency and 
equity of various types of taxes? 
 
A2. Adequacy and Transparency of Information Systems  
 
A2.1  Are the information sources to monitor poverty trends adequate? In particular: 
 
  a.  Are the coverage, frequency and design of household surveys adequate to make 
reliable, comparable, national estimates of poverty? 
  b.  Does the government make metadata and microdata from household surveys 
available? 
  c.  Does metadata comply with the international standard for metadata documentation?  
 




A2.3  Is information to monitor progress on poverty reduction, evaluation methods and 
evaluation results made available to researchers, policy experts, the business community, civil 
society and policymakers outside the executive branch? 
 
A2.4    Is information on the cost and budget of public services and programs publicly 
available? In particular: 
 
  a.  Is information on the costs (administrative costs in particular) of services and 
flagship program(s) publicly available? 
  b.  Is information on the (itemized) budget allocated to specific schools, health care 
facilities, etc. posted in visible places so users can see it? 
 
A2.5  Does the government perform and publish incidence studies? In particular: 
 
  a.  Does the government collect information to do incidence studies of taxes and 
government spending, and make the information available?  
  b.  Is it a legal requirement for the government to provide incidence analysis to the 
legislatures during the budget approval process? 
  c.  Does the government disclose its methods to do incidence analysis to researchers, 
policy experts, business community, civil society and policymakers outside the 
executive branch? 
  d.  Does the country have credible mechanisms for external validation of government 
incidence studies? 
 
A2.6  Does the government make income tax files available in the same way as most 
advanced OECD countries? 
 
5.  CEQ Indicators and Data Requirements 
 
In what follows we describe the main concepts used by CEQ.  In section 6 we present the 
technical definition of each variable used in the questionnaire. 
 




66 is defined as earned plus unearned market incomes before government taxes and 
transfers  of  any  sort.  It  should  include  net  private  transfers,  net  remittances,  and  net  alimony 
payments. Total market income equals earned plus unearned market incomes (monetary and non-
monetary) before government taxes and transfers of any sort. It should include net private transfers, 
net remittances, and net alimony payments AND imputed rent for owner-occupied housing and 
auto-consumption.  Net  market  income  equals  market  income  minus  direct  taxes  and  employee 
contributions to social security. Disposable income equals net market income plus direct monetary 
                                                             
66 Market income is also called primary income. 28 
 
transfers. Post fiscal income equals disposable income plus indirect subsidies (including indirect tax 
expenditures) and minus indirect taxes. Final income equals post fiscal income plus in-kind transfers 
(e.g., imputed value of free or quasi-free government services particularly in education and health), 
minus  in-kind  taxes,  co-payments  in  cash  or  in-kind  e.g.,  when  beneficiaries  of  anti-poverty 
programs are required to contribute with inputs including labor inputs), user fees and participation 
costs (transportation costs; opportunity costs).  
 
Table 1 - Definitions of Income Concepts 
 
Market Income = y
m 
Monetary:  Earned  plus  unearned  market 
incomes before government taxes and transfers 
of  any  sort.  It  should  include  net  private 
transfers,  net  remittances,  and  net  alimony 
payments. 
Total:  Earned  plus  unearned  market  incomes 
(monetary  and  non-monetary)  before 
government taxes and transfers of any sort. It 
should  include  net  private  transfers,  net 
remittances,  and  net  alimony  payments  AND 
imputed  rent  for  owner-occupied  housing  and 
auto-consumption. 
Net Market Income = y
n  Market  income  y
m  minus  direct  taxes  and 
employee contributions to social security 
Disposable Income = y
d 
 
Net  market  income  y
n  plus  direct  monetary 
transfers  
Post-fiscal Income = y
pf 
Disposable  income  y
d  plus  indirect  subsidies 
(including  indirect  tax  expenditures)  minus 
indirect taxes 
Final Income = y
f 
or 




Post-fiscal  income  y
pf  plus  in-kind  transfers 
minus in-kind taxes, co-payments, user fees and 
participation costs.  Or, if indirect subsidies and 
taxes  cannot  be  imputed,  y
f  equals  disposable 
income y
d plus in-kind transfers minus in-kind 
taxes,  co-payments,  user  fees  and  participation 




Source: author’s elaboration based on various documents 
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Note: Final Income* will equal Disposable Income plus in-kind transfers and minus in-kind taxes, 
co-payments, user fees and participation costs. Countries without expenditure surveys will only be 
able  to  estimate  Final  Income*.  There  are  actually  two  ways  that  Market  Income  should  be 
calculated (note that the two different calculations for market income will lead to two different 
calculations for each definition of income). The two calculations are: 1) Monetary: Earned plus 
unearned market incomes before government taxes and transfers of any sort. It should include net 
private transfers, net remittances, and net alimony payments. 2) Total: Earned plus unearned market 
incomes (monetary and non-monetary) before government taxes and transfers of any sort. It should 
include net private transfers, net remittances, and net alimony payments AND imputed rent for 
owner-occupied housing and auto-consumption. 
 
Market Income =    
Earned + unearned market 
incomes (monetary and   
non-monetary) before 
government taxes and 
transfers of any sort 
 
TRANSFERS  TAXES 
Direct monetary transfers 
Net Market Income=    
Disposable Income =    
Direct taxes and employee 
contributions to social security 
  
  
Indirect subsidies (including 
indirect tax expenditures) 
  
   Indirect taxes 
Post-fiscal Income =     
In-kind transfers    
   In-kind taxes,                     
co-payments, user fees and 
participation costs 
Final Income =    30 
 
Data on household market and disposable income can be obtained from standard household 
surveys (although sometimes there is no information on non-monetary income sources such as auto-
consumption).  Disposable  income  is  obtained  as  a  combination  of  available  and  imputed 
information depending on how data on income is collected in the surveys.
67 Indirect subsidies and 
taxes  to  calculate  post-fiscal  income  are  usually  imputed  based  on  consumption  data  from 
household surveys (income-expenditure surveys). In-kind transfers are usually imputed based on the 
reported use of public services by individual households and reported workers’ benefits, and the 
direct average cost of supplying the service based on public expenditures accounts. 
 
Total Government Revenue 
 
Includes the total budgetary income of the federal government: tax and non-tax revenue plus 
income generated by direct budgetary controlled entities or public enterprises. In countries where 
revenue collected at the provincial or state level is important, the total will include the revenues 
obtained by governments at the subnational level. 
 
Social and Redistributive Spending
68 
 
To assess government efforts on the spending side we use social spending from public 
sector accounts and the concept of redistributive spending. Social spending as commonly defined in 
official  government  budgetary  classifications  and  the  concept  of  redistributive  spending  can  be 
different. Social spending typically includes spending education, health, social security and social 
assistance.  Redistributive  spending  includes  education,  health,  and  social  assistance plus  indirect 
consumer subsidies (e.g., food, electricity and gasoline subsidies), some producer subsidies (e.g., 
agricultural  producer  subsidies),  and  “social”  tax  expenditures  (exemption  of  VAT  for  some 
foodstuffs). The information on redistributive spending has to be teased out from public sector 
accounts  at  the  federal  level  (and  provincial  level  in  the  countries  where  study  will  include 
subnational government spending in the analysis). In some countries there is no information on 




Progressivity and Regressivity: Definitions (Table 2 and Figure 5) 
 
                                                             
67 This varies by country. In some countries, household surveys report after direct taxes and social security contributions 
income only; in other countries, they report it before taxes.  The problem is compounded because often wage income is 
after taxes but the situation of self-employment income is left unclear. 
68 In countries for which the concept of redistributive spending cannot be calculated, studies use social spending. For 
definition of redistributive spending see section on indicators. 
69 Strictly speaking one may also distinguish the subsidized from the non-subsidized portion of social security benefits.  
Calculations  can  be  done  by  estimating  social  and/or  redistributive  spending  with  and  without  the  non-subsidized 
portion of social security benefits. 31 
 
Since one criterion of the assessment of governments’ fiscal interventions is based on the extent of 
their  progressivity,  this  is  a  good  place  to  review  the  definitions  used  in  the  literature  of  what 
constitutes a progressive tax and progressive transfer system. The most frequently used method to 
measure the progressivity (or regressivity) of government taxes and transfers is incidence analysis. In 
essence, incidence analysis consists of comparing the amount of transfers (taxes) received (paid) by 
population  quantiles  (usually,  deciles  or  quintiles).    Progressivity  is  measured  in  absolute  terms, 
comparing  transfers  or  taxes  per  capita  among  quantiles;  or,  it  is  measured  in  relative  terms, 
comparing  transfers  or  taxes  as  a  share  of  each  quantile’s  income.    Thus,  a  transfer  will  be 
progressive (regressive) in absolute terms if the poorer one is, the larger (smaller) the size of the 
transfer one receives in per capita terms; a tax will be progressive (regressive) in absolute terms if the 
poorer one is, the less (more) one pays in per capita terms. A transfer will be progressive (regressive) 
in relative terms if the poorer one is, the larger (smaller) the size of the transfer one receives in 
relation to one’s income; a tax will be progressive (regressive) in relative terms if the poorer one is, 
the less (more) one pays in relation to one’s income (Table 2).
70  The convention in the literature on 
incidence analysis is to measure equity of transfers in terms of their absolute progressivity and taxes 
in terms of their relative progressivity (at the minimum, taxes should not be regressive).
71 The CEQ 
uses the same convention.   
                                                             
70 If a transfer is progressive (regressive) in absolute (relative) terms, it follows by definition that it must be progressive 
(regressive)  in  relative  (absolute)  terms,  but  the  converse  is  not  true.  If  a  tax is  progressive  (regressive)  in  relative 
(absolute) terms, it follows by definition that it must be progressive (regressive) in absolute (relative) terms. However, 
the converse is not true. 
71 See Lambert (2002). 32 
 
Table 2 - Definitions of Progressivity of Taxes and Transfers  
  Taxes  Transfers 
  Relative  Absolute  Relative  Absolute 













Poorer people pay 
lower taxes in 
relation to their 
income. Post-fiscal 
income is more equal 
than market 
income. 
  Poorer people get 
larger transfers in 
relation to their 
income. Post-fiscal 
income is more equal 
than market income 
but less equal than 
when transfers are 
also progressive in 
absolute terms. 
Poorer people get 
larger transfers in per 
capita terms. Post-
fiscal income is more 
equal than market 
income and than when 
transfers are 
progressive in relative 
terms. 
 
If transfers are 
progressive in absolute 
terms, by definition they 
are progressive in 
relative terms. The 








  Everyone pays the same proportion of 
taxes in relation to their income. Market 
income and post-fiscal income 
distributions are the same. 
Everyone receives the same proportion of 
transfers in relation to their income. Market 














Poorer people pay 
more taxes in 
relation to their 
income. Post-fiscal 
income is more 
unequal than market 
income but less 
unequal than when 
taxes are regressive 
in absolute terms. 
Poorer people pay 
more taxes in per 
capita terms. Post-
fiscal income is more 
unequal than market 
income and more 
unequal than when 
taxes are regressive 
in only relative 
terms. 
 
If taxes are regressive 
in absolute terms, by 
definition they are 
regressive in relative 
terms. The converse is 
not true. 
Poorer people get 
smaller transfers in 
relation to their 
income. Post-fiscal 
income is more unequal 
than market income. 
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Figure 5 - Lorenz Curves for Progressive and Regressive Transfers 
 
6.  Technical Definitions of Variables and Indicators  
DEFINITIONS 
 
Definitions of income 
 
NOTE: All the income variables will have to be calculated in per capita and per adult equivalent 
units as defined below. 
Per capita household income      and                  
  For each definition of income below, individual  ’s per capita income    should be calculated 
dividing household income by the number of members in the household and dividing 
household income by equivalized number of members using OECD equivalence scales (for 
comparability with other studies). 
    
  
     
                
  
                    
where    is the income of the household, M is the number of members in the household,   
is the number of adults in the household, and   is the number of children in the household.  
 
1.  Market income      34 
 
There are two ways that Market Income should be calculated (note that the two different 
calculations for market income will lead to two different calculations for each definition of 
income). The two calculations are: 1) Monetary: Earned plus unearned (monetary) market 
incomes before government taxes and transfers of any sort. It should include net private 
transfers, net remittances, and net alimony payments. 2) Total: Earned plus unearned market 
incomes (monetary and non-monetary) before government taxes and transfers of any sort. It 
should include net private transfers, net remittances, and net alimony payments AND 
imputed rent for owner-occupied housing and auto-consumption. 
2.  Net market income      
Market Income    minus direct taxes and employee contributions to social security. 
3.  Disposable income      
Net market income    plus direct monetary transfers. 
4.  Post-fiscal income       
  Disposable income    plus indirect subsidies (including indirect tax expenditures) minus 
indirect taxes. 
5.  Final income      
  Post-fiscal income      plus in-kind transfers minus in-kind taxes, co-payments and user 
costs. Whenever possible, a second estimate of final income should include participation 
costs such as opportunity cost of waiting in line, transportation costs, etc. (final income 
should be presented with and without the latter). 
6.  Final income*       
Disposable income y
d plus in-kind transfers minus in-kind taxes, co-payments and user fees. 
Whenever possible, a second estimate of final income* should include participation costs 
such as opportunity cost of waiting in line, transportation costs, etc. (final income* should 
be presented with and without the latter). 
 
Definitions of Poverty Lines 
 
7.  Income poverty line     
The standard international income poverty lines are $2.50 PPP per day (per capita) for 
extreme poverty and $4 PPP per day (per capita) for poverty. To convert these poverty lines 
into local currency poverty lines, the PPP conversion rate should be selected for the same 
year as the survey. If the PPP conversion rate is obtained from the World Development 
Indicators Databank, the series “PPP conversion factor, private consumption (LCU per 
international $)”. The monthly local currency poverty line is equal to the PPP per day 
poverty line times 30.42 (365 days per year/12 months per year) times the PPP conversion 
factor (of local currency units per PPP dollar). 
A relative poverty line set at 50% of national median per capita disposable income should 
also be used to allow for comparability with the same figures calculated for advanced 
countries and national poverty lines. 
If a national or official poverty line (or set of official regional poverty lines) is available, it 
should be used as well. 
8.  Education “Poverty Line” (Critical Level) 35 
 
The critical level of schooling is 12 years for upper middle income countries and 9 years for 
lower middle income countries. However, estimates should be done for both critical levels 
for comparability. 
9.  Health “Poverty Line” (Critical Level) 
The critical level for health is a basic health insurance or package.  
 
Definitions of Macroeconomic Variables 
 
The macro indicators should be expressed in local currency. In addition, they should be from the 
same year in which the household surveys used to calculate poverty were conducted. Most can be 
obtained from the country's national accounts or from the World Development Indicators Databank 
(databank.worldbank.org). Please specify which source is used for each indicator.  Include the 
hyperlink or a copy of the page where the information came from for verification purposes. 
 
10. Gross Domestic Product       
If obtained from the World Development Indicators Databank, the series “GDP (current 
LCU)” should be used. 
11. Population     
Population counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for refugees 
not permanently settled in the country of asylum. If taken from the World Development 
Indicators Databank, the series “Population, total” should be used. 
12. Total government revenues 
Total government revenues include the total budgetary income of the federal government: 
tax and non-tax revenue plus income generated by direct budgetary controlled entities or 
public enterprises. In countries where revenue collected at the provincial or state level is 
important, the total should include the revenues obtained by governments at the sub-
national level if possible. Specify whether subnational revenue is included, and if so, include 
one figure with all revenues and one with only federal revenues (for comparability with other 
countries). 
13. Total government spending 
Total government spending according to public sector accounts. Write down specific 
definition of total government spending used in your study; specify when it is federal and 
subnational; when it includes current spending and public investment; when it is with or 
without employers’ and employees’ social security contributions.     
14. Social spending: total, disaggregated and social spending allocated to the poor 
Social spending according to public sector accounts should be expressed as a total and 
disaggregated into health, education, social security and social assistance. Furthermore, 
figures should be provided for spending on social security including employer/employee 
contributions and the non-contributory component only. Include the definitions used in 
your country for each category of social spending. For social spending allocated to poor, 
based on the definition of social spending, consider what is allocated to anti-poverty 
programs, basic education, basic health care, etc. as specified in the public sector budget.  
This may not be feasible in some countries. In addition, report the social spending allocated 
to the poor that is monetary only (not in-kind). Include definitions used in your country. 
15. Redistributive spending: total, disaggregated and redistributive spending allocated to the poor. 36 
 
Redistributive spending includes education, health, and social assistance plus indirect 
consumer subsidies (e.g., food, electricity and gasoline subsidies), some producer subsidies 
(e.g., agricultural producer subsidies), and “social” tax expenditures (exemption of VAT for 
some foodstuffs). The information on redistributive spending has to be teased out from 
public sector accounts at the federal level (and provincial level in the countries where study 
will include subnational government spending in the analysis). In some countries there is no 
information on other forms of redistributive spending; in such cases, one should confine the 
analysis to social spending. Redistributive spending should be expressed as a total and 
disaggregated into health, education, social security and social assistance. For redistributive 
spending allocated to poor, based on the definition of redistributive spending, consider what 
is allocated to anti-poverty programs, basic education, basic health care, etc. as specified in 
public sector budget. In addition, report the redistributive spending allocated to the poor 
that is monetary only (not in-kind). Include definitions used in your country. 
 
Definition of Net Transfers 
 
Net transfers equals transfers (subsidies) minus taxes (which could include co-payments, fees, etc.). 
Which transfers and taxes are included depends on the definition of income being used. 
 
Identifying Transfer Recipients 
 
Direct Identification Method 
On some surveys, questions specifically ask if households received benefits from certain social 
programs, and how much they received. When this is the case, it is easy to identify transfer recipients 
and add or remove the value of the transfers from their income, depending on the definition of 
income being used. 
 
Inference Method 
Unfortunately, not all surveys have this information. In some cases, transfers from social programs 
are grouped with other income sources (in a category for “other income”, for example). In this case, 




In the case that neither the direct identification nor the inference method can be used, transfer 
benefits should be simulated. For example, in the case of a conditional cash transfer that uses a 
proxy means test to identify eligible beneficiaries, one can replicate the proxy means test using 
survey data, identify eligible families, and simulate the program’s impact. However, this method 
gives you the potential impact of transfers with perfect targeting and no errors of inclusion or 
exclusion.  In order to correct for the overestimation of the incidence of benefits, you can use 
information on the errors of inclusion and exclusion estimated for other countries. 
  
NOTE: It is very important to specify which transfer identification method you are using for 
each program AND to present results separately by method.   
 





NOTE: Poverty gaps should be reported in local currency, and should be yearly. Calculations will 
have  to  be  done  using  all  the  selected  poverty  lines  and  with  income  (and  consumption  when 
available) in both per capita terms and as equivalized income (definitions are above).  
 
16. Before Net Transfers Income Poverty Gap or Market Income Poverty Gap       
  The sum of the distances between each poor person's market income    and the income 
poverty line. Poor people are defined here as people whose market income    is below the 
income poverty line  . 
              
 
   for            and for all    
      
  where    is the headcount of the market income poor (defined below). 
17. After Direct Taxes Income Poverty Gap or Net Market Income Poverty Gap       
  The sum of the distances between each poor person's net market income    and the income 
poverty line. Poor people are defined here as people whose net market income    is below 
the income poverty line  . 
              
 
   for            and for all    
      
  where    is the headcount of the net market income poor (defined below). 
18. After Direct Net Transfers Income Poverty Gap or Disposable Income Poverty Gap       
The sum of the distances between each poor person's disposable income    and the income 
poverty line. Poor people are defined here as people whose    is below the income poverty 
line  . 
              
 
    for            and for all   
      
where    is the headcount of the disposable income poor (defined below). 
19. After Direct and Indirect Net Transfers (Subsidies) Income Poverty Gap or Post-Fiscal Income Poverty Gap 
       
The sum of the distances between each poor person's post-fiscal income     and the 
income poverty line. Poor people are defined here as people whose     is below the income 
poverty line  . 
               
  
    for             and for all   
       
  where     is the headcount of the post-fiscal income poor (defined below). 
20. After Direct, Indirect and In-kind Net Transfers Income Poverty Gap or Final Income Poverty Gap       
The sum of the distances between each poor person's per capita final income    and the 
income poverty line. Poor people are defined here as people whose    is below the income 
poverty line  . 
              
 
    for            and for all   
      
  where    is the headcount of the final income poor (defined below). 
21. After Direct and In-kind Net Transfers Income Poverty Gap or Final Income* Poverty Gap        
The sum of the distances between each poor person's final income*     and the income 
poverty line. Poor people are defined here as people whose     is below the income poverty 
line  . 38 
 
               
  
    for             and for all   
       
  where     is the headcount of the final income poor (defined below). 
22. Headcount of the Income Poor      
The number of people whose per capita income    is less than the poverty line  . Multiple 
headcounts should be calculated, using each definition of income and different poverty lines 
(see above). The superscript j refers to each definition of income. 
23. Income Poverty Headcount Index    
   
The number of people whose per capita income    is less than the poverty line  , expressed 
as a percentage of the total population. Multiple headcount indices should be calculated, 
using each definition of income and different poverty lines (see above). The superscript j 
refers to each definition of income. 
   
   
  
  
where   is the total population (defined under Macroeconomic variables). 
24. Income Poverty Gap Ratio     
   
The sum of the distances between each poor person’s income and the poverty line, divided 
by total population and expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. Multiple poverty gap 
ratios should be calculated, using each definition of income and different poverty lines (see 
above). The superscript j refers to each definition of income. 
      
   
 
 
    
 
 
     
  where   is the total population and         takes a value of 0 when       . 
25. Squared Income Poverty Gap Ratio     
   
The sum of the squared distances between each poor person’s income and the poverty line, 
divided by total population and expressed as a percentage of the poverty line. This indicator 
takes the distribution of income among the poor into account by weighting the distance that 
each poor person’s income is below the poverty line. Multiple squared poverty gap ratios 
should be calculated, using each definition of income and different poverty lines (see above). 
The superscript j refers to each definition of income. 
    
   
 
 




   
 
  where   is the total population and         takes a value of 0 when       . 
 
NOTE: The Income Poverty Headcount Index, Income Poverty Gap Ratio, and Squared Income 
Poverty Gap Ratio should also be calculated before and after transfers (using market and final 
income) for the following subgroups of the poor: male-headed vs. female-headed households, age of 
household head (grouped as less than 25 years old, 25-40, 41-64, 65 or more), different racial or 
ethnic groups, urban vs. rural households, etc. These calculations only need to be performed using 




26. Total Demand for Education Coverage Among the Market Income Poor        
Calculated by multiplying the number of children in poor households times the relevant cost 
(public spending) per student (taking into account the different costs by level) plus the 
required demand-side subsidies to keep children in school. Children are defined as 39 
 
individuals between 6 and 18 years old (inclusive) and poor children are defined as children 
who live in households whose per capita market income    is below the corresponding 
poverty line  . Poor children who have already achieved the critical level of schooling are not 
included in the calculation. The critical level of schooling is 12 years for upper middle 
income countries and 9 years for lower middle income countries but calculations should be 
done for both for comparability purposes. Information should be presented for the whole 
“gap” but also by the number of children in the relevant age group and the average per 
capita cost by level. 
        
                                       
  
                                                        
where    is the total number of students at level   (  = primary, lower secondary, secondary, 
tertiary) and    is the total number of poor school age children at level   
27. Total Demand for Health Coverage Among the Market Income Poor        
Calculated by imputing the cost of providing a standard health package to all the market 
income poor. Equivalently, the cost of a basic health insurance or package per insured 
person times the headcount of the market income poor. 
                                                                             
28. Before Net Transfers Human Capital Gap         
The sum of the total demand for education coverage among the market income poor and 
the total demand for health coverage among the market income poor. 
                    
29. After Net Transfers Education Coverage Gap      
The before transfers Education Coverage Gap minus actual education spending on the 
market income poor by level (defined below) 
                  
30. Actual Education Spending on the Market Income Poor       
Calculated using standard benefit incidence analysis, by multiplying the number of children 
in poor households attending public school times the relevant cost (public spending) per 
student plus the actual demand-side subsidies given to poor households, all by level. 
31. After Net Transfers Health Coverage Gap      
The before net transfers Health Coverage Gap minus actual government health spending on 
the market income poor (defined below). 
                  
32. Actual Health Spending on the Market Income Poor       
Calculated using standard benefit incidence analysis: that is, imputing the amount of 
government subsidized health-related goods and services received by all the market income 
poor.  “Received” will be measured two ways: by use of services and by rights of access to 
health services. The former is calculated as follows: the number of households who report 
using the contributory or non-contributory public health services at least once times the cost 
of the basic health package. The latter is calculated by multiplying the number of households 
who are covered by contributory or non-contributory public health services times the cost of 
the basic health package. 
33. After Net Transfers Human Capital Gap       
The sum of the after net transfers education coverage gap and the after net transfers health 
coverage gap. 





34. Before Transfers Overall Poverty Gap         
The sum of the Before Net Transfers Income Poverty Gap and the Before Net Transfers 
Human Capital Gap 
                       
35. After Transfers Overall Poverty Gap       
The sum of the After Net Transfers Income Poverty Gap and the After Net Transfers 
Human Capital Gap. Multiple After Transfers Overall Poverty Gaps should be calculated, 
using each of the definitions of income (except market income) and selected poverty lines 
(see above). 
               
 
Multi-dimensional Poverty Index 
 
Based on Alkire and Santos (2010), for a household to be considered deprived in the dimension of 
education, (e) three criteria will be used: i) if the household head has failed to complete 12 or 9 years 
of schooling in upper-middle and lower-middle income countries, respectively; ii) if all members of 
school-age are not enrolled; and iii) if at least one adult member has not completed the minimum 
required level of education for their age. In the case of health (h), a household will be deprived in 
this dimension if the head does not have access to medical services from either the public or the 
private sector. This is justified assuming that benefits are extended to the other household members. 
Finally, for the dimension of income (y), calculations will be based on the aforementioned poverty 
lines: $2.5 and $4 PPP a day (per capita), a relative poverty line, and the official poverty line in each 
country. In any case, a household will be considered deprived in this dimension if its per capita (or 
equivalized) income is at or below the monetary threshold (income poverty line). 
The aggregation follows the class of indices proposed by Alkire and Santos (2010), expressed as: 
    
 
     
 
   
 
         
   
  
 
               (1) 
      being a parameter of dimension-specific aversion to poverty;     the quantity of available 
dimensions   for household   (with          );    the threshold for each dimension;   the total 
number of dimensions; and    the weight given to each dimension, such that    
 
       . Each of 
the three components of education has equal weight within the education dimension, so if education 
as a whole has a 1/3 weight, each of the three components will have a weight of 1/9 of the index. 
When      , equation (1) yields the adjusted headcount ratio (       ), which is the product of two 
measures: the multidimensional headcount ratio (       ), and the average deprivation share across the 
poor  (namely  breadth  of  deprivations)  expressed  as:             
    ,  with     being  the  total 
population;   the number of households deprived in   or more dimensions  , and    the number of 41 
 
deprivations experienced by household  .
72 The variable   is the sum of weighted dimensions in 
which  a  household  is  deprived  in  order  to  be  considered  multidimensionally  poor  (i.e.  the   
th 
household will be multidimensionally poor if         , and non-poor otherwise). Notice that as 
  goes  up,  the  number  of  multidimensionally  poor  households  goes  down,  but  the  breadth  of 
deprivations in these households goes up. 
This methodology evaluates economic and human capital indicators individually using a between 
dimensions weighting system (i.e. the relative weight of income, health and education). Regarding 
the definition of weights, it is proposed to use equal weights assuming that no dimension is more 
important than another.  
 
Overall,  households  will  be  identified  as  multidimensionally  poor  by  counting  the  number  of 
dimensions  for  which             (i.e.  counting  the  number  of  deprivations)  and  then  checking 
whether this number (  ) is equal to or exceeds the cut-off  , say 1 out of 3 dimensions, 2 out of 3 
dimensions,  or  3  out  of  3  dimensions.  Notice  that  this  procedure  indicates  that  each  of  the 
dimensions is receiving equal weighting (1/3 each, with the education dimension being the weighted 
sum of its three components). Formally,        for all          , and therefore the identification 
threshold goes from       to        
 
If a country has adopted a multi-dimensional poverty index in its official reporting (e.g., Mexico), the 
index should be calculated with the methodology utilized by the country as well. 
 
Inequality 
36. Market Income Gini         
Graphically, the market income Gini is represented by the area between the market income 
Lorenz curve and the line of equality. The market income Lorenz curve maps the cumulative 
share of market income on the vertical axis against the distribution of the population on the 
horizontal axis.  
                       
 
   
where   is the cumulative proportion of the total population when individuals are ordered in 
increasing income values using market income (graphically,   is also equivalent to the line of 
perfect equality) and      is the Lorenz curve. 
37. Net Market Income Gini         
Net Market Income Gini should be calculated by the same method as above, using market 
income to construct the Lorenz curve. 
38. Disposable Income Gini         
Disposable Income Gini should be calculated by the same method as above, using 
disposable income to construct the Lorenz curve. 
                                                             
72 When      , equation (1) yields the adjusted poverty gap, defined as the weighted sum of dimension-specific poverty 
gaps; and when       it yields the adjusted squared poverty gap, defined as the weighted sum of the dimension-specific 
squared poverty gaps. 42 
 
39. Post-fiscal Income Gini          
Post-fiscal Income Gini should be calculated by the same method as above, using post-fiscal 
income to construct the Lorenz curve. 
40. Final Income Gini         
Final Income Gini should be calculated by the same method as above, using final income to 
construct the Lorenz curve. 
41. Final Income* Gini          
Final Income* Gini should be calculated by the same method as above, using final income* 
to construct the Lorenz curve. 
42. Other Inequality Measures 




Plot Lorenz curves for each definition of income but with households ranked by market income on 
the horizontal axis.   
 
Fiscal (Tax and Benefits) Incidence Curves 
 
Plot before transfers (using market income) and after transfers (using each of the other definitions 
of income) incidence curves by percentile and/or twentieth-tiles. 
 
Government Effort – NOTE: In order to ensure comparability among countries these 
benchmark regressions are provided by the author; DO NOT estimate them 
43. Government Revenue Effort       
Government revenue effort is calculated by performing ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of log GDP per capita (PPP) against total government revenues as a percent of 
GDP of all countries for which data is available. The country’s government revenue effort is 
equal to two times its residual value (actual value minus predicted value) divided by the 
standard deviation of the residual, plus five. 
         
              
                     
44. Tax Collection Effort       
Tax collection effort is calculated by performing ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
log GDP per capita (PPP) against total tax revenues as a percent of GDP of all countries for 
which data is available. The country’s tax collection effort is equal to two times its residual 
value (actual value minus predicted value) divided by the standard deviation of the residual, 
plus five. 
          
              
                     
45. Income Tax Collection Effort        
Income tax collection effort is calculated by performing ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of log GDP per capita (PPP) against tax revenues on income, profits, and capital 
gains as a percent of GDP of all countries for which data is available. The country's income 
tax collection effort is equal to two times its residual value (actual value minus predicted 
value) divided by the standard deviation of the residual, plus five. 43 
 
           
              
                   
46. Wealth Tax Collection Effort        (the available) 
Wealth tax collection effort is calculated by performing ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of log GDP per capita (PPP) against tax revenues on property as a percent of 
GDP of all countries for which data is available. The country’s wealth tax collection effort is 
equal to two times its residual value (actual value minus predicted value) divided by the 
standard deviation of the residual, plus five. 
           
              
                   
  Note: the necessary data is currently not available to calculate the WTCE. 
47. Government Spending Effort       
Government spending effort is calculated by performing ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions of log GDP per capita (PPP) against government spending as a percent of GDP 
of all countries for which data is available. The country’s government spending effort is 
equal to two times its residual value (actual value minus predicted value) divided by the 
standard deviation of the residual, plus five. 
         
              
                   
48. Social Spending Effort       
Social spending effort is calculated by performing ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions 
of log GDP per capita (PPP) against social spending as a percent of GDP of all countries for 
which IMF data is available. The country’s social spending effort is equal to two times its 
residual value (actual value minus predicted value) divided by the standard deviation of the 
residual, plus five. 
         
              
                   
 





Sufficient combined resources 
Combined resources collected by the government is sufficient to close a poverty gap if its 
value is strictly larger than the value of the poverty gap. 
R1.2 
Consistent 
Total revenues are consistent with the country’s GDP per capita if the government revenue 
effort (GRE) (defined under the “Government Effort” section of Basic Indicators) is greater 
than 5. Tax revenues are consistent with the country’s GDP per capita if the tax collection 
effort (TCE) (defined under "Basic Indicators") is greater than 5. 
R1.3 
Low per capita income 
  Latin American countries that are lower-middle or low income can be classified as having 
low per capita income if they have 2009 GDP per capita of less than $4000 PPP per year. 
R2.1 44 
 
Sufficient (resources allocated to redistributive spending) 
  Redistributive spending is potentially sufficient to close the poverty gap if its value is strictly 
larger than the value of the poverty gap. 
R2.2 
Consistent 
  Government spending is consistent with the country’s GDP per capita if the government 
spending effort (GSE) (defined under "Basic Indicators") is greater than 5. Social spending is 
consistent with the country’s GDP per capita if the social spending effort (SSE) (defined 
under "Basic Indicators") is greater than 5. 
R2.3 
High military spending 
  According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), high military 
spending is defined as military spending greater than 4% of GDP. 
NOTE: we do not provide figures that might serve as a benchmark for large subsidies to other 
sectors, overblown administration, or a large debt burden; it will be up to the country experts to 
determine if these factors might explain why the government does not allocate sufficient resources 





Sufficient (proportion of redistributive spending allocated to closing the before net transfers poverty gaps) 
  The proportion of redistributive spending allocated to closing the before net transfers 
poverty gaps is potentially sufficient to close the poverty gap if its value is strictly larger than 
the value of each poverty gap. 
E2.1 
Too large (net transfers to the non-poor) 
  Net transfers to the non-poor are too large if total net transfers is sufficient to close the 
poverty gap but total net transfers allocated to the poor is not. 
E2.2 
Quantiles 
  Quantiles ideally should be centiles. If that is not feasible, twentieth-tiles, deciles or quintiles 
can be used. 
Suits index
73  
  The Suits index is a concentration coefficient for taxes. First, a tax concentration curve is 
constructed, with cumulative share of taxes paid on the vertical axis and cumulative share of 
market income on the horizontal axis. Graphically, the Suits index is twice the area between 
the line of equality (which can also be interpreted as the line of tax neutrality) and the tax 
concentration curve. If the tax concentration curve lies above the line of equality, the Suits 
index will be negative, which indicates that taxes are progressive in absolute terms. 
                  
 
   
                                                             
73 See Suits (1977). 45 
 
  where   is the cumulative proportion of total population when individuals are ordered in 
increasing income values using market income (graphically,   is also equivalent to the line of 
perfect equality) and     is the tax concentration curve. 
Kakwani index
74 
  Graphically, the Kakwani index is twice the area between the market income Lorenz curve 
and the tax concentration curve. If the tax concentration curve is above the Lorenz curve, 
the Kakwani index will be negative, which indicates that taxes are regressive in relative terms. 
Equivalently, the Kakwani index can be calculated as the Suits Index minus the market 
income Gini. If market income is not available, use the net market income Gini. 
                          
Middle range 
  The boundaries for middle range should be given by the non-poor that are not in the top 10 
percent. 
Progressive in absolute terms (programs and policies) 
  Poorer people get larger transfers in per capita terms. Post-fiscal income is more equal than 
market income and than when transfers are progressive in only relative terms. Note: if 
transfers are progressive in absolute terms, by definition they are progressive in relative 
terms. The converse is not true. 
Progressive in relative terms (programs and policies) 
  Poorer people get larger transfers in relation to their income. Post-fiscal income is more 
equal than market income but less equal than when transfers are progressive in only absolute 
terms. 
Neutral (programs and policies) 
  Everyone receives the same proportion of transfers in relation to their income. Market 
income and post-fiscal income distributions are the same. 
Regressive (programs and policies) 
  Poorer people get smaller transfers in relation to their income. Post-fiscal income is more 
unequal than market income. 
Consistent 
Income tax revenues are consistent with the country's GDP per capita if the income tax 
collection effort      (defined under “Basic Indicators”) is greater than 5. Taxes on wealth 
are consistent with the country's GDP per capita if the wealth tax collection effort      
(defined under “Basic Indicators”) is greater than 5. 
Progressive (taxes) 
  Poorer people pay less taxes in relation to their income. Post-fiscal income is more equal 
than market income. 
Neutral (taxes) 
  Everyone pays the same proportion of taxes in relation to their income. Market income and 
post-fiscal income distributions are the same. 
Regressive in absolute terms (taxes) 
  Poorer people pay more taxes in per capita terms. Post-fiscal income is more unequal than 
market income and more unequal than when taxes are regressive in only relative terms. 
                                                             
74 See Kakwani (1977). 46 
 
Note: if taxes are regressive in absolute terms, by definition they must be regressive in 
relative terms. 
Regressive in relative terms (taxes) 
Poorer people pay more in taxes in relation to their income. Post-fiscal income is more 
unequal than market income but less unequal than when taxes are regressive in absolute 
terms. 
Impact on inequality 
The impact of each program or policy on inequality is measured as its impact on the market 
income Gini, independent of the other programs (i.e., the impact of each individual program 
assumes the other programs do not exist). Calculate the Gini (and other inequality measures) 
using market income plus transfers from one program or policy. The market Gini after 
program j should be recorded, as well as the percent reduction in the Gini caused by the 
program: 
         
                           
 
       
This should be done for each flagship program or policy, always beginning with market 
income and only removing the transfers from one program. The combined impact must be 
calculated the same way, by calculating the Gini using market income plus combined 
transfers from the flagship programs and policies. NOTE that the combined impact is not 
equal to the sum of their impacts or the sum of the percentage point Gini reductions caused 
by each program. 
Simulated impact on inequality 
The simulated impact of each program is measured as its impact on the market income Gini, 
independent of the other programs (i.e., the impact of each individual program assumes the 
other programs do not exist). Simulate the impact of one program or policy by assuming that 
it has perfect targeting (no leakages to non-eligible households) and complete coverage of 
the target population (all eligible families receive the appropriate transfer) according to the 
program’s eligibility rules. The market Gini after program j should be recorded, as well as the 
percent reduction in the Gini caused by the program: 
                  
                                                                             
 
       
This should be done for each flagship program or policy, always beginning with market 
income and only removing the transfers from one program. The combined simulated impact 
must be calculated the same way, by calculating the Gini using market income plus simulated 
combined transfers from the flagship programs and policies, assuming perfect coverage and 
targeting. NOTE that the combined simulated impact is not equal to the sum of their 
simulated impacts or the sum of the percentage point Gini reductions caused by each 
simulated program. 
E3.1 
Redistributive programs and policies 
Examples of programs: conditional or unconditional cash transfer programs; workfare or 
employment (or employment guarantee) programs; programs to protect poor households 
from the financial impact of illness, disability or death; programs to provide non-
contributory health insurance; programs to prevent people from falling into poverty during 
old age; programs or policies specifically addressed to building human capital and assets of 
the poor; early childhood development programs for poor children; programs for pregnant 47 
 
and lactating poor women; programs for poor youth at risk; programs to increase school 
attendance of the poor (e.g., scholarships, school feeding programs, CCTs); programs to 
improve the poor’s nutrition and health (e.g., food coupons, subsidized basic foodstuffs, 
nutritional supplements, etc.); programs to improve the poor’s access to housing; programs 
to improve the poor’s access to energy (e.g., differential prices); programs to improve the 
poor’s access to credit and private insurance; programs to empower the poor; programs to 
reduce social exclusion and discrimination; programs to support/empower ethnic minorities; 
programs to empower women; programs to achieve other socially desirable objectives. 
Examples of policies: tax systems, public education systems, public health systems, pension 
systems, price subsidies, price support systems, subsidies to specific sectors (e.g., agriculture). 
Coverage rate among the poor 
The percentage of the poor that are covered by the specific programs and overall. 
Equivalently, number of covered poor divided by total number of poor. 
Coverage rate among relevant sub-groups 
The percentage of members of each sub-group that are covered by the specific program. 
Equivalently, the number of covered members of the sub-group divided by the total number 




Examples of targeted safety net programs include cash transfers, food stamps, school 
feeding programs, food-for-work, and food distribution programs. 
E3.4 
More likely to be poor 
Estimate a probit regression to predict the probability of being poor before net transfers 
(using market income), using only the household heads as observations. Possible 
independent variables include geographical region, gender, marital status, educational 
attainment, age, race, number of children (or a dummy variable equal to 1 if the household 
has children), precarious location (i.e. a dummy variable equal to 1 if living in a shantytown), 
and urban/rural. Please specify how the variables are defined (i.e. how urban and rural areas 
are defined). 
More likely to be excluded 
Estimate a probit regression to predict the probability of being poor after net transfers 
(using final income) conditional on being poor before net transfers. 
E3.5 
Impact on the headcount index, poverty gap ratio, and squared poverty gap ratio 
See the instructions for calculating the impact on inequality above, and replace       with 
  
 ,    
 , and   
   
Simulated impact on the headcount index, poverty gap ratio, and squared poverty gap ratio 
See the instructions for calculating the simulated impact on inequality above, and replace 
      with   
 ,    
 , and   
   
E4.1 
Average Poverty Gap       
The average poverty gap is equal to the Before Net Transfers Income Poverty Gap divided 
by the number of market income poor. 48 
 
     
   
    
E5.1 
Squared After Net Transfers Poverty Gap Ratio    
   
The Squared Income Poverty Gap, defined under “Poverty” in “Basic Indicators”. Here, the 
after-transfers Squared Income Poverty Gap Ratio refers to   






Taxes that do not prevent market efficiency by creating distortions or externalities in the 
market. 
Windfalls 








Evaluations that are not carried out by the government. Ideally, these evaluations should be 
carried out by academics. 
International standards for quality of social services 
This could be measured using PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) and 
SERCE (Second Regional Comparative and Explanatory Study). 
Exit strategy 
Process under which a program has a plan to help the beneficiaries escape poverty and no 





Credible mechanisms for external validation 
Credible mechanisms for external validation could include academics, independent national 
organizations, or international organizations such as the Socio-Economic Database on Latin 
America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC), the United Nations' Economic Commission on 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), or the World Bank. 
A2.1 
International standard for metadata documentation 
International standards for metadata documentation can be measured using the Accelerated 
Data Program, established by PARIS21, World Bank, and others (2009), or the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard established by the International Monetary Fund. 49 
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